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The future of Russian outward foreign direct 
investment and the eclectic paradigm:
What changes after the crisis of 2008–2009?
Az orosz tőkeexport és az eklektikus paradigma 
jövője: Mi változik a 2008–2009. évi válság után? 
This article explores the future of Russian outward foreign direct investment in the aftermath of the crisis 
of 2008–2009. As it is too early to analyse the full impact of the crisis, it develops hypotheses about the 
degree of slowdown in the foreign expansion of Russian transnational corporations. It uses an extension 
of the eclectic paradigm to home country advantages (competitive environment, business environment, 
development strategy, State involvement) applied to a comparison of the Russian Federation with other 
economies in transition as an analytical tool. Systematic differences between transnationals from the 
Russian Federation (global firms, based on natural resources, aiming for vertical integration of assets) and 
from new European Union member countries (regional firms, based on downstream activities or services, 
aiming for horizontal integration) allow us to formulate more solid conclusions about the future of the 
Russian firms facing lower export prices, lower market capitalizations and higher debts. In turn, this article 
argue that a comparison with the large emerging economies of Brazil, China and India, under the acronym 
of BRIC can be less useful in the current context, as these economies are significantly less affected by the 
crisis of 2008–2009 than the Russian Federation; hence they can not expect a slowdown in their outward 
foreign direct investment similar to that of Russian transnationals. 
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Over a historically brief period (a decade and a half), the Russian Federation has become 
a major outward investing country on a global scale. According to data from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), registered outward foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) stock of the Russian Federation’s increased from U.S.$ 2 billion in 
1993 to U.S.$ 255 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008), making it the 15th most important source 
economy of investments worldwide, and the second largest among emerging economies 
(defined as developing and transition countries together), behind Hong Kong (China) only, 
and ahead of Brazil, China, India and South Africa, to mention a few. However, with the 
onset of a major financial crisis in the second half of 2008, which affected the Russian 
economy deeply, questions are raised about the immediate future, as well as the long-term 
sustainability of those large outward investments.
This article argues that questions about the future of Russian outward FDI are particularly 
acute because the timing of crisis coincides with a change in the business cycle of Russian 
transnational corporations (TNCs): after a stage of very fast foreign expansion, time has 
come to consolidate the foreign assets, resulting in a slower growth abroad (and even a retreat 
in some cases). The future is thus uncertain to predict with exactness. However, if a right 
analytical framework is applied to the Russian outward FDI phenomenon, certain trends 
can be predicted. This article applies two of them: one is a business case study methodology, 
in which the most salient current problems of Russian TNCs are analysed; the other is a 
more theoretical one: an extended version of the eclectic paradigm (extended to a separate 
home-country factor) applied to the Russian Federation in comparison to other economies 
in transition (acknowledging that the two methods can partly overlap). In turn, this article 
argues that the analysis of the future of Russian outward FDI has to be detached from the 
“BRIC” Group (Brazil, Russian Federation, India and China), as the three other economies 
do not share any common characteristics with the Russian Federation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, a business case study analyses briefly 
the periods of boom and halt in Russian outward FDI, with a special reference to its natural 
resource base. It is followed by an argument about by the analytical framework of the BRIC 
group is no longer valid. The subsequent section applies the extended eclectic paradigm 
to the Russian Federation in comparison to other economies in transition. The conclusion 
formulates some general hypotheses about the future of Russian outward FDI.
Boom and slowdown
According to official statistics, in the late 1990s and till 2007, the growth rate for Russian 
outward FDI stocks was by far the fastest among emerging markets, faster than other newly 
emerging source countries such as India, or rapidly expanding offshore centres such as 
the British Virgin Islands. However, the three-digit growth rate of the outward FDI stock 
of The Russian Federation is partly a statistical artefact. It may well be that in the 1990s, 
the outward investment position of the country was largely underreported. After 1999, the 
Bank of Russia started receiving increasingly accurate information but was not fully in a 
position to revise its previous reporting. That is partly confirmed by a look at the difference 
between outflows and outward stock data over the period 1999–2007: the cumulative 
outflows of that period reached U.S.$ 117 billion, while the outward FDI stock rose by 
U.S.$ 245 billion.1 Naturally, part of the discrepancy may be due to changing valuations or 
the fact that not all the private sector outflows of that period were correctly recorded under 
1 See the data of the UNCTAD FDI/TNC database.
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FDI. Nevertheless, the dynamics of flow data too indicates fast growth. The main salient 
feature about the period of take off (especially 2000–2007) is that fact that lower middle-
income The Russian Federation became mostly unexpectedly a net capital exporter, and 
some of its firms, such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Norilsk Nickel, and Severstal, for example, have 
already leapfrogged to a global status, due to their aggressive strategies of foreign expansion 
and leveraging of their natural-resource-base (expansion financed by borrowing).
While Russian corporations that expand internationally constitute a mostly diverse 
group of firms in terms of ownership structures, motivations, and strategies, the most 
important and the largest ones of them (Gazprom, Lukoil, Norilsk Nickel, United Company 
of Rusal, etc.) are strongly linked with the natural resources of their home base. Of the 25 
largest Russian TNCs of 2007 ranked by foreign assets (Skolkovo and VCC, 2008), there 
were 3 oil and gas firms, which occupied the top 2 positions), 6 iron and steel companies, 
2 mining companies, and one metals company. These firms together account for U.S.$ 
72 billion in foreign assets (figure 1), of which two companies (Lukoil and Gazprom) 
were responsible for more than half (U.S.$ 34 billion). This means that natural-resource-
based firms accounted for four-fifths of the foreign assets of the top 25. Setting aside the 
methodological differences between FDI and foreign asset data, a rough estimate can be 
made to compare the foreign assets of the top 25 (U.S.$ 72 billion) against the total outward 
FDI stock of the Russian federation at the same year (2007) (U.S.$ 255 billion). The former 
amounts for 35% of the latter, and given the fact that the top 25 list may exclude certain 
non-reporting large companies, this ratio is an indication of a very high concentration of 
outward FDI by a few firms.
Figure 1
Foreign assets of the top 25 Russian TNCs and outward FDI stock of the
Russian Federation, 2007(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Author’s calculations, based UNCTAD FDI/TNC database and Skolkovo and VCC 2008.
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The crisis that started in 2008 affected all business around the world 
negatively, including Russian TNCs. The general negative fallout of the crisis 
includes reduced access to finance; a sharp deterioration of perceptions about business 
prospects by TNCs; and a strong risk aversion of all businesses (UNCTAD, 2009). 
Indeed, the financial crisis of 20083 has reached the Russian Federation quickly and in 
many senses augurs badly for outward investing Russian TNCs. 
There are certain circumstances that make the impact of the crisis particularly 
strong on Russian firms. For example, greenfield investments (new investments and 
                                                 
3 By 2009, this financial crisis had become a general economic crisis. 
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The crisis that started in 2008 affected all business around the world negatively, including 
Russian TNCs. The general negative fallout of the crisis includes reduced access to finance; 
a sharp deterioration of perceptions about business prospects by TNCs; and a strong risk 
aversion of all businesses (UNCTAD, 2009). Indeed, the financial crisis of 20082 has reached 
the Russian Federation quickly and in many senses augurs badly for outward investing 
Russian TNCs.
There are certain circumstances that make the impact of the crisis particularly strong 
on Russian firms. For example, greenfield investments (new investments and expansion of 
existing facilities) which seem to be so far been quite resilient to the crisis (UNCTAD, 2009) 
represent a small portion of outward FDI by Russian TNCs, as the latter have preferred 
M&As in their vision to leapfrog to global status (Kalotay, 2008). This is so because cross-
border M&As are not just larger in terms of the size of the project but, unlike greenfield 
investments, require a large upfront payment. In times of crisis, it is exactly those financial 
resources that become scarce.
Another problem arose from the above mentioned industry structure of Russian 
outward FDI. As the prices of their export commodities – the main source of their revenues 
– declined sharply for natural-resource based Russian firms in 2008 (-20% for steel, -54% 
for oil and -63% for nickel; figure 2), the continued financing of activities – including the 
ones abroad – became more difficult. This in turn affected the market valuation of Russian 
firms: the Russian market index fell by 71% in 2008, twice as much as the Dow Jones, and 
sharper than in other large emerging economies (figure 2). The decline in export prices and 
domestic market valuations inevitably led to a weakening of GDP growth and currency 
devaluation. The latter in turn made foreign expansion for Russian TNCs more expensive 
when expressed in rouble terms.
Figure 2
Year-to-year changes of selected stock market indices and
commodity prices, 2008 (Billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on raw data published in the Russian & CIS Daily of Unicredit Aton, Moscow. 
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While financing difficulties were mounting, the corporate debt of large Russian firms 
was rising (to an estimated U.S.$ 110 to be paid in 2009)3 as a result of past strategies of 
strong leveraging. This is almost double the total owed in Brazil, India and China together. 
Since the changes in markets in 2008, this level of debt is no longer sustainable against 
the current valuation of Russian corporate assets. The list of Russian TNCs that have high 
international debts (estimated to have tripled it from 2006–2008) include United Company 
Rusal, Norilsk Nickel, TMK and Sistema. This inevitably leads to either for a need to find 
new sources of capital (for example in the form of State investment in troubled companies 
or foreign investments) or to a further consolidation of the universe of largest Russian 
TNCs (with the “healthier” companies taking over the debt-ridden ones). Government 
assistance in the case of Russian firms can come from State-owned Vnesheconombank, 
which is responsible for handling the bailouts. In return for the loans, Vnesheconombank is 
requiring a representative at the company and the right to veto any debt or major asset sale. 
One more unfavourable development in the Russian Federation in 2008 was the 
recurrence of capital flight, which by and large disappeared after 1999. The central bank 
estimated having lost U.S.$ 131 billion in foreign reserves in the second half of 2008 alone.4 
This capital flight in turn further reduces the capabilities of public authorities to bail out 
firms in trouble.
To some extent even the ownership structure of Russian TNCs (a mix of oligarchs and 
State) became a disadvantage, making it more difficult to raise financial resources form 
other sources. For example, in the past, some of the Russian TNCs have financed their 
expansion via initial public offerings (IPOs). With their export prices low, they can no 
longer engage in IPOs. Moreover, State ownership and influence has made raising money 
abroad more difficult, as the onset of the crisis coincided with foreign policy problems 
(such as the war in Georgia, and gas transit crisis with Ukraine) that made the foreign 
sources of financing even more reluctant to lend to companies associated with The Russian 
Federation as a home country. 
Despite all these negative developments, it is not yet certain to what degree Russian FDI 
would be affected in 2009 and beyond. Over the first 9 months of 2008, outward FDI flows 
were still increasing, to U.S.$ 43 billion, up from U.S.$ 36 billion over the same period of 
2007.5 It was only in the last quarter of 2008 that outward FDI projects had to be put on 
hold and sometimes divested. For example, Lukoil attempted to acquire a 26% share in 
Spain’s Repsol in November and December 2009 but did not find the necessary financing 
and had to shelve the deal. Other Russian firms such as Norilsk Nickel had to go even 
further and divest from existing foreign assets (it closed in October 2008 its Cawse plant 
in Western Australia, aiming to put it up for sale; and sold its minority stakes in Canadian 
auto parts producer Magna and German building company Hochtief). Another sign of 
slowdown of outward FDI from the Russian Federation is the cutting by Russian TNCs of 
their overall investment outlays in 2009. For example, Lukoil decided to cut investment 
spending in 2009 by 40%, to U.S.$6 billion, down from more than U.S.$10 billion in 2009, 
due to the appearance of a net loss in its accounts in the fourth quarter of 2008, marking 
3 See “Oligarchs Seek $78 Billion as Credit Woes Help Putin (Update2)”, Bloomberg, 22 December 2008.
4  See www.cbr.ru/eng/.
5  See www.cbr.ru/eng/.
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the “worst ever quarter in the whole history of Lukoil”.6 These cuts affect investments both 
at home and abroad.
The crisis of the BRIC hypothesis
One way of formulating hypotheses about the future of Russian outward FDI would be 
through a comparison with large developing economies such as Brazil, China and India. 
Indeed, such comparison under the acronym of BRIC has become a commonplace these 
days (see e.g. Gammeltoft, 2008; Sauvant, 2005). Below we will argue however that this is not 
the proper analytical framework, as these four countries were put together by a historical 
accident, without sharing major common characteristics.
To recall, the hypothesis about the existence of an economic group called BRIC was first 
formulated by Goldman Sachs in 2001.7 Already at the beginning, these four countries 
shared surprisingly few common characteristics: they are big and they are not developed 
countries. In turn, from the outset, it was difficult to create meaningful common analysis 
for a group of four diverse countries that consisted of three developing countries and a 
country in transition (the Russian Federation); two major importers of natural resources 
(China and India) and a major exporter of the same (the Russian Federation); a global 
export platform (China), a global services platform (India), a global source of natural 
resources (The Russian Federation) and a regional economic power (Brazil; two countries 
of fast growing population (Brazil and India) and a country of shrinking population (The 
Russian Federation), two “liberal” democracies (Brazil and India), a “limited” democracy 
(the Russian Federation) and a one-party state (China). These countries could develop 
only apart from each other. Moreover, differences between are not derived from a common 
historical co-evolution that would explain scientifically their differences, but are due to 
historical “accidents”. Hence in most cases the four can not be analysed together in a fully 
scientific manner.
In terms of outward FDI, despite all expectations (Sauvant, 2005), the BRICs have not 
played the role of locomotive among developing and transition economies. Since the 1990, 
the share of all developing and transition economies in world outward FDI stock has been 
mostly on a rising curve: it was around 8% around 1990, by 1997, it reached a peak of 15%, 
declining somewhat to 12% in 2003–2004, and reaching a new record of 16.4% in 2007 
(figure 3). That means that effectively their share more than doubled over 1990–2007. In 
turn, the share of the BRICs was declining between 1990 and 2000 (from 2.6% to 1.7%), and 
rose only after 2000, to 3.3% in 2007 (figure 3). As a result, the net gain in the share of the 
BRICs was only a quarter in 1990–2007. As a result, while the BRICs represented 31.5% of 
the outward FDI stock of developing and transition economies, by 2007, their participation 
declined to 20% (figure 3).
6 See “Lukoil Posts Loss; Cuts Spending on Weak Ruble, Oil (Update1)”, Bloomberg, 7 April 2009 (www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aO18xz3VKreQ&refer=home, accessed on 20 April 2009)
7 See “Another BRIC in the wall”, The Economist, 21 April 2008.
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Figure 3
Share of developing and transition economies in world outward
FDI stock, 1990–2007 (Per cent)
 
 Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the UNCTAD FDI/TNC database. 
 
A counter-argument raised against this bleak picture of BRICs missing the role of locomotive 
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the numbers of non-BRIC developing and transition countries. This criticism is partly 
warranted. Indeed, if the outward FDI stock of the BRIC countries is compared to only 
the countries that the World Bank defines as middle and low-income, the differences are 
significantly lower between the whole group and the BRICs (figure 3). The rise of the share 
of middle and low-income countries in world outward FDI stock between 1990 and 2007 
is from 4.8% to 6% only, while the relative importance of the BRICs in the middle and low-
income total increases marginally, from 53% to 54%.
It has to be noted however that the elimination of high-income economies from the 
group of developing and transition countries misses out various important economies 
which still consider themselves both politically and economically part of the developing 
world (Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, 
Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Trinidad and 
Tobago, United Arab Emirates, to mention a few; table 1). In that sense, the use of the list 
of middle and low-income countries can be more misleading than the group of developing 
and transition economies as a whole. Moreover, it excludes those high-income emerging 
economies which more or less recently became high-income countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Israel, Slovenia; table 1). The only weak point of the United Nations classification 
is that it puts the middle-income new European Union (EU) members already into the 
category of developed economies (table 1). However, as it will be shown later on, the 
outward FDI stock of these economies is small in absolute terms, and unlike the cases of 
Hong Kong (China), Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, do not 
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have any major impact on the absolute values of outward FDI stock from developing and 
transition economies.
Table 1
Main differences between the definitions of developing and transition
economies, versus middle and low-income economies, 2007
‘Developing and transition’ includes high-income 
economies:
‘Middle and low-income’ excludes all high-income 
economies but includes:
Asian tigers: Middle-income developed 
Hong Kong, China countries (new EU members): 
Korea, Republic of Bulgaria 
Singapore Hungary 
Taiwan Province of China Latvia 
High-income oil exporters: Lithuania 
Bahrain Poland 
Brunei Darussalam Romania 
Kuwait Slovakia 
Qatar  
Trinidad and Tobago And still excludes high-
United Arab Emirates income ‘emerging economies’:
Offshore financial centres: Czech Republic 
Aruba Estonia 
Barbados Israel 
British Virgin Islands Slovenia 
Cayman Islands 
Netherlands Antilles  
Source: the author.
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 accelerated the differentiation of 
the BRICs in general economic performance (in terms of exchange rate stability and GDP 
growth) and prospects for outward FDI, making the hypothesis of a single group even more 
difficult to hold. In 2008/2009, the Russian Federation was the weakest performer on all 
measures, and China was the strongest (table 2). In other terms, the Russian Federation is 
perceived as an economy largely affected by the crisis while China, and to a lesser extent 
Brazil and India, seem to be relatively resistant, although far from being isolated. This in 
turn can have major implications for outward FDI. Until recently, the Russian Federation 
seemed to be the most dynamic of the four, although mostly relying on a handful of large 
natural-resource-based companies, and on borrowed financial resources. In the future, 
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these vulnerabilities may slow down Russian outward FDI, and less so the foreign expansion 
of Brazilian, Chinese and Indian TNCs.
Table 2
Brazil, China, India and Russia: Change in the estimated GDP growth rate,
2009/2008, and change in the dollar exchange rate,
February 2009/February 2008 (Percent)
Country GDP growth, 2008
GDP growth, 
2009
Change, 
2009/2008
Change in dollar 
exchange rate
Brazil 5.3 1.6 -3.7 -29.3
China 9.0 6.0 -3.0 4.0
India 5.3 5.0 -0.3 -22.0
Russian Federation 6.0 1.0 -5.0 -33.1
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the EIU (GDP growth) and from the FXConverter of OANDA. 
In the future, a more meaningful and deeper analysis of outward FDI from the former BRICs 
would probably need to put each country into the region to which it belongs, and with 
which it shares more common characteristics: Brazil together with other Latin American 
countries, especially the larger ones such as Argentina and Mexico; China and India 
together with other major Asian developing countries such as Indonesia, the Republic of 
Korea or Thailand; and the Russian Federation together with other economies in transition 
(such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine), or with new EU member countries (such as Poland), 
even if the latter’s outward FDI is much smaller in scale and scope than the outward FDI of 
Russian TNCs. This is the methodology that the subsequent section will apply. 
The application of an extended eclectic paradigm to the post transition space
The extended eclectic paradigm as an analytical framework
In order to draw systematic conclusions about the future of outward FDI from the Russian 
Federation, we will benchmark it against the outward FDI performance of other transition 
or former transition (new EU member) economies. The analytical framework applied here 
is John H. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of ownership (O), locational (L) and internalization 
(I) advantages in its most recent elaboration (Dunning, 1988; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) 
which differentiates between distinguished between asset (Oa) advantages and transaction 
(Ot) advantages, extended to the factor of home country (H) advantages (table 3).
The selection of the eclectic paradigm for this analysis reflects the fact that so far the 
rise of new, emerging sources of outward FDI has not led to the birth of new separate 
theories of TNC behaviour covering these new home countries and regions, but rather 
to “special theories of ” of those TNCs “nested” within the “general theory” of TNCs and 
FDI (UNCTAD, 2006: 146). In other words, we can not speak about separate theories 
of United States, European, Japanese or developing-country TNCs, but rather about 
the adjustment and application of a general theory to their specific characteristics. This 
approach is particularly useful in the sense that whatever modification or extension is made 
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to the general theory from the point of view of one group of TNCs, it can feed back to, and 
interact with, the specific theories of other groups of TNCs. As for TNCs from economies 
in transition, we have no convincing case (yet) that they would be an exception to that rule, 
and would alone require a fully new theory.
The selection of the eclectic paradigm as the main envelope of this analysis can be also 
justified on the grounds that until a theory is fully rejected (“falsified”) by new evidence, 
it is better to modify and fine tune it, instead of trying to build a completely new one from 
scratch. This evolutionary stance, as opposed to any forced revolution, allows us to use the 
experience gained so far with the existing theory. Naturally the use of extant theorems for 
new phenomena requires a high degree of flexibility in terms of additions and modifications; 
otherwise inflexible attachment to old theories developed in another context and another 
time would make it difficult to explain new evidence gained in a new context.  
In this spirit of respect to tradition and flexibility, the extension of the eclectic paradigm 
from an OLI framework to an OLIH framework (the order of letters can be disputed) is a 
hypothesis formulated in relationship of the Russian outward FDI phenomenon (Kalotay, 
2008). This extension has been suggested in answer to the theoretical problem created by 
the invention, and then increasing application, of Ot advantages, especially to developing- 
and transition-economy firms: these advantages are no longer located strictly within the 
boundaries of the firm; they rather exist somewhere on the border line of the firm and 
its environment (mostly but not exclusively the home economy). How do we know then 
that they still belong to ownership advantages, and not to the home country environment? 
Additionally, as will be demonstrated, in these economies TNCs respond to a series of 
factors that can no longer be attributed to the parent firm at all, such as the domestic 
policy environment or State intervention. If we want to take these into consideration as 
part of the eclectic paradigm, we have to extend it to a new, home country, factor that 
could accommodate rightly those influences. If this extension is applied to Russian TNCs, it 
seems to hold well. It will remain to be tested if it also holds to TNCs from other emerging 
economies, or even to traditional TNCs which wish to rely more than traditionally on the 
help of their home country authorities to support their foreign expansion.
So far, there has been no major indication that the hypothesis of the home country 
advantages as an extension of the traditional eclectic paradigm needs to be rejected.8 In 
turn, it requires further elaboration, for example in terms of differentiating between various 
subsets of advantages, such as home country based competitive (Hc), business environment 
(Hb), development strategy (Hd) and State involvement (Hs) advantages (table 3). As for Hc 
advantages, we understand that they have to be treated in combination with the traditional 
Ot advantages – or better say, some of the former Ot may need to be reclassified to Hc (table 
3). All this will then be applied to the case of current and former economies in transition, 
highlighting what the main systematic differences are and how they affect outward FDI.
8 Paz Estrella Tolentino (2008) attempted to prove, through a vector autoregression (VER) model, that in the foreign 
expansion of Chinese and Indian TNCs, the impact of the home country withers away (with the exception of the national 
technological capabilities of India). It has to be noted however that the results of this study are to be taken with much 
caution because the size of the sample was many times smaller than the one required for a robust VAR analysis. Moreover, 
the study also suffers from a flaw in its logic that is unfortunately frequently committed by economists: it confuses the 
lack of evidence (which it really finds) with the evidence of the non-existence of the phenomenon (which it claims to find). 
Similar examples of faulty logic are found in highly regarded studies, too (e.g. Carkovic and Levine, 2002, on the alleged 
lack of spillovers and lack of GDP impact of FDI), whose strongly formulated conclusions for these reasons can not be 
accepted.
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It also has to be discussed briefly what order the different factors of the extended eclectic 
paradigm should follow. If one looks at the original OLI, there is no indication of explicit 
order, although it can be derived from the logic of the paradigm that ownership advantages 
are primus inter pares, or are a necessary but not sufficient condition of foreign expansion, 
without which the other two advantages would lose most of their meaning. We would argue 
that the added H advantages play a similar role as O advantages, and in this sense they 
would need to precede the L and I advantages. What is even more, in certain emerging 
economies, and the Russian Federation is surely one of them, H advantages may be the 
single most important factor of outward FDI, and for this reason, they could be put at the 
beginning of the acronym. However, in due respect to the original theory, and admitting 
that this is only an extension of a major intellectual effort started more than three decades 
ago (Dunning, 1977), we keep for the moment being, the H factor at the end: OLIH.
The outward FDI scoreboard of economies in transition
The outward FDI scoreboard of current and former economies in transition proves the 
existence of certain systematic differences among these economies that will allow us to apply 
the extended eclectic paradigm to these cases in a systematic manner. The most important 
of these differences are related to the absolute and relative size of outward FDI in different 
economies of the region (table 4). For analytical purposes, we differentiate between three 
groups: the Russian Federation itself, a category of its own; 7 relatively important source 
economies of outward FDI from Central and Eastern Europe, of which 6 are new members 
of the EU, while Croatia is currently negotiating its accession to the EU – they are called 
sometimes as the “Seven Dwarves” (Kalotay, 2006) as their outward FDI is small compared 
to the Russian Federation;9 and three major source countries of outward FDI from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine10 (table 4). 
In absolute terms, the Russian federation is a giant compared to the other economies in 
transition. In 2007 its outward FDI stock was more than four times higher than that of the 
“Seven Dwarves” combines, and 20 times more than that of the three other CIS countries 
(table 4). Since 2000, this difference has remained practically unchanged vis-à-vis the 
“Seven Dwarves”: it was higher in 2001 but has declined since then. Compared to the other 
three CIS countries which are particularly latecomers to outward FDI, the difference used 
to be bigger until 2003 and has been reduced since then. Nevertheless, the huge difference 
between frontrunner Russian firms and the others seems to persist.
Compared to the inward FDI stock, again a major difference exists between the Russian 
Federation, in which the outward FDI stock has tended to come close the volume of the 
inward FDI stock, despite a very fast increase of the latter in the 2002s (table 4), and all the 
other economies, where the same ratio was typically under 20% in the same period, with 
some notable exceptions, such as high-income Slovenia and oil exporting Azerbaijan over 
the same period, or dynamic Estonia at the end of it (table 4). As will be discussed in section 
c, those patterns are a clear indication of differences in the internationalization strategies of 
those economies in the new millennium.
9 The outward FDI stock of the remaining 4 new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania) is even smaller than that of the “Seven Dwarves”.
10 The outward FDI stock of the remaining 8 CIS member countries is marginal.
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As for the comparison of outward FDI stock with gross domestic product (GDP), the 
ratio of the Russian Federation has fluctuated around 20% since 2002, while in the rest of 
the sample, most of the ratios remained under 10%, with the exception of again Azerbaijan 
and very small Estonia (as well as Hungary and Slovenia at the very end of the period of 
observation). Here again, there is an indication of divergent development paths followed 
by these economies. This issue will be analysed in detail in section c, especially under the 
Hd advantages. 
Table 4
Outward FDI from selected economies in transition, 2000–2007
(Millions of U.S. dollars and per cent)
Region/economy 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Russian Federation         
Outward FDI stock  20 141  44 219  62 350  90 873  107 291  146 679  209 559  255 211
As a % of inward FDI stock 62.5 83.6 88.0 93.9 87.7 81.3 77.2 78.8
As a % of gross domestic product 7.8 14.4 18.0 21.1 18.1 19.2 21.3 19.8
The “Seven Dwarves”         
Poland         
Outward FDI stock  1 018  1 156  1 453  2 147  3 228  6 279  16 291  19 644
As a % of inward FDI stock 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.7 6.9 13.1 13.8
As a % of gross domestic product 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.1 4.8 4.7
Hungary         
Outward FDI stock  1 280  1 556  2 166  3 509  6 018  7 836  12 177  18 282
As a % of inward FDI stock 5.6 5.7 6.0 7.3 9.6 12.6 14.9 18.8
As a % of gross domestic product 2.7 2.9 3.2 4.2 5.9 7.1 10.8 13.2
Czech Republic         
Outward FDI stock  738  1 136  1 473  2 284  3 760  3 610  5 017  6 971
As a % of inward FDI stock 3.4 4.2 3.8 5.0 6.6 6.0 6.3 6.9
As a % of gross domestic product 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.5 4.0
Slovenia         
Outward FDI stock  768  989  1 505  2 350  3 025  3 300  4 554  6 123
As a % of inward FDI stock 26.5 38.1 36.6 37.3 39.9 45.5 51.0 59.2
As a % of gross domestic product 3.9 4.9 6.6 8.2 9.1 9.4 11.9 13.3
Estonia         
Outward FDI stock  259  442  676  1 028  1 419  1 940  3 613  5 873
As a % of inward FDI stock 9.8 14.0 16.0 14.7 14.1 17.2 28.5 35.4
As a % of gross domestic product 4.6 7.1 9.3 10.5 11.9 13.9 21.8 27.6
Croatia         
Outward FDI stock  825  889  1 674  2 033  2 128  2 047  2 415  3 495
As a % of inward FDI stock 29.6 22.8 27.7 23.9 17.2 14.0 8.8 7.8
As a % of gross domestic product 4.5 4.5 7.3 6.9 6.0 5.3 5.6 6.8
Slovakia         
Outward FDI stock  374  449  485  823  835  597  1 154  1 609
As a % of inward FDI stock 7.9 8.0 5.7 5.6 4.0 2.5 3.0 4.0
As a % of gross domestic product 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.2 2.1 2.1
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CIS countries         
Ukraine         
Outward FDI stock  170  156  144  166  198  468  334  6 077
As a % of inward FDI stock 4.4 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.7 1.4 16.0
As a % of gross domestic product 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 4.3
Azerbaijan         
Outward FDI stock  5  17  343  1 260  2 465  3 685  4 391  4 676
As a % of inward FDI stock 0.1 0.4 6.4 14.6 20.2 30.9 38.7 70.9
As a % of gross domestic product 0.1 0.3 5.5 17.3 41.5 27.8 20.9 15.9
Kazakhstan         
Outward FDI stock  16 - 10  417  300  972  1 142  992  2 149
As a % of inward FDI stock 0.2 -0.1 2.7 1.7 4.3 4.5 3.0 5.0
As a % of gross domestic product 0.1 .. 1.7 1.0 .. .. .. 2.1
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database.
The application of an extended eclectic paradigm
The extended eclectic paradigm offers a good analytical framework for differences within 
the post-transition space in terms of outward FDI, with all elements having a special 
significance for that analysis. The application of the OLIH to economies in transition below 
takes into consideration the findings of the most important summaries of outward FDI 
from those countries, prepared by, among others, Wladimir Andreff (2003), Marjan Svetlicic 
and Matija Rojec (2003), Marjan Svetlicic (2004), Kálmán Kalotay (2004a), as well as country 
case studies by Katalin Antalóczy and Magdolna Sass (2008, for Hungary), Andreja Jaklic 
and Marjan Svetlicic (2003, for Slovenia), Kálmán Kalotay (2008) and Kari Liuhto (2005, 
for the Russian Federation), Dariusz Rosati and Witold Wilinski (2003, for Poland), Urmas 
Varblane et al. (2001, for Estonia), and Alena Zemplinerová and Marie Bohatá (2004, for the 
Czech Republic).11
Ownership advantages
In economies in transition, ownership – or competitive – advantages have a similar 
meaning as in other parts of the world. Their main utility is derived from the fact that 
they compensate for the additional costs of setting up and operating foreign affiliates 
compared to those faced by local host-country producers (Dunning, 1988). This is true 
to all economies in transition – in fact to all countries engaged in outward FDI (table 3). 
There is however a difference in the mix of asset (Oa) and transaction (Ot) advantages: Oa 
advantages, which are derived from the ownership of specific assets, for example physical 
property or intangible assets (technology, patents, reputation etc.), are less elaborate and 
less developed in economies in transition than in developed countries. It is in fact true 
to all current and former economies in transition. There is however a major difference 
between the Russian Federation and other CIS members on the one hand, and the “Seven 
11 There are unfortunately no good summary studies on outward FDI from individual CIS countries outside the Russian 
Federation.
Region/economy 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Dwarves” on the other: the former derive most of their advantages from upstream assets, 
while the latter draw most of them from the downstream, or from services activities. As 
for the broadness of the firm base of Oa advantages, it is relatively broad in the Russian 
Federation, although differences in size are enormous (figure 1), while the company base is 
relatively narrow in the rest of the sample.
Ot advantages, derived from firm size and the subsequent economies of scale, 
management experience, privileged access to resources, to finance etc., are very important 
for all economies in transition because they compensate for the relative weakness of Oa 
advantages. In the Russian Federation and other parts of the CIS, it manifests itself as 
a capacity to turn around substandard assets (Kalotay, 2008). In this sense, TNCs from 
economies in transition share a common characteristic with many other new TNCs from 
around the world (UNCTAD, 2006). From the main characteristic of Russian TNCs, one 
can deduct that often these firms do not possess technology-related ownership advantages 
in the classical sense (Ot), although they possess some organizational advantages (Oa), as 
witnessed by their relative successes in less than perfect business environments.
The organizational advantages of Russian firms are in part linked to a special ‘Russian’ 
way of doing business and acquiring assets abroad, which enable Russian TNCs to overcome 
in some cases the reluctance of target countries to accept Russian investment. This method 
of investment abroad consist of transactions taking place through shadow (offshore) firms 
instead of purchasing shares up front in the TNCs’ own names (Kalotay, 2008). These 
strategies of proxy-based operations, however, can be double-edged in the longer term. 
In the short term, they are increasing outward FDI. In the longer term, however, they can 
reduce the readiness of host countries to accept Russian FDI. The strategy of using proxies 
such as privately owned Western firms to acquire assets abroad are usually seen as low-
transparency transactions that raise concerns in host countries about intentions although 
Russian experts insist that that the funds used for those transactions are of legal origin 
(Livshits, 2001). Moreover, while these transactions may be seen as competitive advantages 
in the short run, they may complicate expansion abroad in the longer run. 
Home country advantages
Home country advantages are particularly important in explaining the foreign expansion 
of TNCs from economies in transition. It is not fully surprising as the latter have less 
experience in operating in a market economy environment than their peers from developed 
or even developing countries. Therefore, the relative weaknesses of ownership advantages 
are compensated for by home country advantages.  
The combination of Ot and Hc advantages is particularly salient in the case of Russian 
TNCs and TNCs from other CIS countries (table 3). In the cases of these TNCs, outward 
FDI has relied substantially on oligopolistic advantages, derived from dominant positions 
in the home market; these advantages have then often been reinforced by home country 
policies, favouring the creation of national champions (see below). Large Russian firms 
have always shown a desire for the domestic consolidation of their respective industries, 
as corroborated by the frequency of merger talks and hostile takeover bids in The Russian 
Federation (Radygin, 2002). Oligopolistic positions and mergers then often result in high 
profitability and fast growth, at least until the beginning of the crisis of 2008–2009. For 
example, over the full year of 2008, total sales increased in 24 of the 25 largest Russian 
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firms ranked by market capitalization (Kalotay, forthcoming), sometimes with double-digit 
growth. This is a situation very different from that of the new EU member countries, where 
the domestic market has been very competitive from the outset, forcing TNCs from these 
often small countries to go abroad at an early stage (Svetlicic, 2003). 
The effect of the home country business environment (Hb; both in terms of advantages 
and disadvantages), has been very important in all economies in transition, although in 
different ways (table 3). In some cases, the home country business environment has given 
a positive impetus to outward FDI, resulting in an “expansion” of formerly domestically 
oriented firms (to use the categories created by Kari Liuhto, 2005). In other case, the domestic 
business environment proved to be difficult, resulting in an “exodus” of firms (idem.). The 
situation has varied by groups of counties. In the Russian Federation, until recently, exodus 
dominated. Then from 1999, the motivation of expansion abroad was gaining importance, 
until the beginning of the crisis in 2008, which reinforced exodus again. This experience 
has been different from those of the TNCs from the new EU members where expansion has 
been the dominant motivation from the outset, and of the CIS countries, where exodus still 
dominates.
The push of Russian firms to go abroad (exodus) has undergone major changes over 
time. In the early periods of transition, the Russia the business environment was very 
difficult, prompting Russian firms to create safety nest abroad, protecting them from host 
country uncertainty (Bulatov, 1998). In general, the motivations of exodus have undergone 
various cycles: they were strong at the beginning the transition (early 1990s), followed by 
less “capital flight” in the mid-1990s, followed by the crisis of 1998, which prompted a rise 
in “capital flight” again, and a normalization, especially under President Putin (1999–2008) 
(Kalotay, 2002). Most recently, the advent of the global crisis in 2008 and its negative fallout 
for Russian has resuscitate the motivation of exodus again, as evidenced by the dwindling 
the central bank reserves.
The reliance of the Russian Federation on outward FDI as a channel of transition and 
internationalization goes back to the history of privatization in The Russian Federation in the 
1990s, whereby not only large industrial groups were created, but these firms immediately 
started consolidating their industries,12 first at home, and then abroad, with the latter being 
a logical expansion of domestic expansion. The firms that became Russian TNCs had been 
created through a rushed privatization, under which “international investors were almost 
totally excluded from the mass privatization in 1992 and later from Loans for Shares in 
1995 (which allowed the companies’ capital to be transferred to a number of oligarchies 
at greatly reduced prices). Not until 1997 were the restrictions on their participation in 
Russian companies’ capital lifted” (Locatelli, 2006, pp. 1081–1082).
Home country development strategy advantages (Hd) in all economies in transition are 
linked to the methods and strategies adopted during the transformation from centrally 
planned to market economy and reintegration to the world economy in the 1990s (table 
3). In the Russian Federation, those methods and strategies were based on the creation 
of national champions, a long-term protection from inward FDI, especially in strategic 
industries, and an increasing emphasis on promoting outward FDI (although eh latter 
started rather spontaneously in the 1990s; see Bulatov, 1998).
12 In 2001, the Russian investment bank Troika Dialog calculated that around 70 large financial and industrial groups 
controlled 40% of the Russian GDP (Shekshnia, 2001).
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This strategy was almost a geometrically opposite of the transition of future new EU member 
countries, where transformation from the outset was (at least partly) based on reliance 
on inward FDI, which in some cases entailed the sales of “crown jewels” (for example 
Skoda in the Czech Republic) to foreign investors. It was estimated that by 1998, only 
3% of former state properties had been sold to foreign buyers in the Russian Federation, 
compared to 48% in Hungary and 15% in the Czech Republic (Kalotay and Hunya, 2000). 
Moreover, privatization sales to foreigners in the latter groups accelerated after 1998, while 
it remained practically non-existent in the Russian Federation. As a result, the outward FDI 
flows of new EU member countries were limited to either a handful of firms that remained 
in local hands, or to a phenomenon called “indirect FDI” (Altzinger et al., 2003; Kalotay 
2004b), under which the foreign owners of affiliates in these countries used those affiliates 
as “springboards” for investing in other, less advanced economies in transition (in most 
cases in South-East Europe). No wonder then that the outward FDI of new EU members in 
much smaller and more geographically concentrated than those of the Russian Federation.
The Hd advantages of other CIS countries have been much less developed and different 
from those of either the Russian Federation or of new EU member countries, as they were 
based, until recently, on tendencies towards autarky, under which neither inward nor 
outward FDI was encouraged. According to data on their outward FDI stocks (table 4), it 
was only very recently that, based on high natural resource revenues, some of their State-
owned firms started investing abroad.
The Hs advantages of economies in transition are related to two main factors: government 
policies towards outward FDI; and State ownership in outward investing firms (table 3). 
Government policies toward outward FDI in each transition economy have undergone 
changes; moving usually from reservations through acceptance towards some kind of 
promotion (Kalotay, 2002). In some new EU countries such as Slovenia and Hungary 
acceptance and some forms of moderate promotion came relatively early (around 2000), 
while in the case of the Russian Federation, and especially other CIS countries, it came 
later on. Moreover, while the Russian Federation has always had implicit policies towards 
outward FDI, even today they are less articulate than in developed countries. During the 
presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999), it was the Russian State that actively contributed to 
the creation of the large private monopolies, which gave birth to the future TNCs, although 
it did not intend to promote actively outward FDI at that time. Under the presidency of 
Vladimir Putin (1999–2008), the Russian state has clearly shifted its objectives towards 
promoting outward FDI, mostly in the service of national strategic goals.13 “The implicit 
part of the strategic government policy is the creation of Russian-owned corporations in key 
industries of the Russian economy with either state finance (such as funding capital received 
from the state, favourable loans from Kremlin-friendly financial organizations, etc) or by using 
administrative measures, i.e. using authorities (such as environmental, construction, taxation, 
or regional authorities, etc) to slow down the operations of a foreign competitor or non-
Kremlin loyal Russian corporation. This policy may also be called the National Champions 
 
 
13 See “Gosudarstvo podderzhit expansiyu rossiyksogo biznesa na zarubezhnykh rynkakh” [The State 
supports the expansion of Russian business on foreign markets]. Pravda.ru, 25 March 2005, www.pravda.ru/
economics/2005/7/21/63/19414 expansion.html (accessed on 3 February 2006).
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Policy” (Liuhto, 2008: 5). As for institutional support, it is still in the stage of planning at the 
moment of writing this article.14
Hs advantages also manifest themselves in the form of State ownership of outward 
investing firms. This is the case of some outward investing Russian firms, such as Gazprom, 
Rosneft, Sovcomflot and Alrosa, as well as some Azeri and Kazakh outward investing firms 
(State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic and KazMunaiGas). In turn, it is almost fully 
absent in the case of outward FDI from new EU member countries whose outward FDI is 
almost completely based on private firms. In the Russian Federation, moreover, one can 
observe a shift over time towards more State ownership and more State intervention, best 
reflected in the case of Gazprom whose strategy aims increasingly at controlling its value 
chain, especially the downstream markets, in key developed economies, especially in Europe, 
following national strategic goals set by the majority owner: the State (Liuhto, 2008). It has to 
be recalled that the state regained majority ownership in Gazprom in 2005 only (Dittrick, 
2005). It is also to be recalled that the period of 2004–2005 brought about the dismantling 
of one of the largest privately owned Russian TNCs, Yukos whose assets ended up mostly in 
the hands of the State-owned company Rosneft. A look at the 25 largest Russian  companies 
by absolute size at the end of 2008 (Kalotay, forthcoming) reveals that no less than 55% of 
their aggregate market capitalization is due to State owned firms, while in terms of foreign 
assets, State-owned TNCs account for 26% of total of the top 25.
Moreover, the relationship between the Russian State and private business has also 
changed since the mid 2000s, in favour of the former. As a result, private TNCs also follow 
Government strategic objectives, without being owned by the latter (Liuhto, 2008; UniCredit 
Aton Research, 2008).
 State ownership however, can be both an advantage and a disadvantage: It can facilitate 
the expansion of Russian firms into locations with good diplomatic relations, and offer 
some kind of guarantee in case of engaging in risky projects abroad or in case of a crisis. 
However, it can be a handicap in case of international political conflicts, such as the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts and the war in Georgia. Moreover, the implementation of 
State policies at the expense of business considerations can be harmful to profits.
Locational advantages
L advantages are a key for all TNCs’ decisions to select in which country to undertake FDI 
or international production. Location-specific advantages (see Dunning, 1988) indicate that 
foreign production is possible for the TNC by combining goods, services and technology 
transferred (in most cases) from the home country15 with partly or fully immobile factors 
(e.g. land, labour,16 skills) or intermediate goods and services in another country. However, 
to do so, TNCs must possess at least some competitive advantages (O advantages) over 
the firms in foreign market, or should possess specific home country advantages which 
14 See “VEB gotov sozdat’ Agenstvo po strakhovaniyu eksportnykh kreditov i investitsiy [VEB ready to establish Export 
Credit and Investment Insurance Agency]”, RBC Daily, 8 December 2008, www.rcb.ru/news/17381 (accessed on 91 March 
2009); and “VEBu trebuyetsya docherneye agensto [VEB needs affiliate agency]”, Vremya online, 9 December 2008, www.
vremya.ru/2008/228/8/218786.html (accessed on 19 March 2009). 
15 In some cases, they can be transferred from an affiliate in a third country, or, in the case of some emerging economy 
TNCs, the transfer can be reverse.
16 Labour is at least partly immobile.
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increases their competitiveness on foreign markets. For that reason, in our analysis, L 
advantages are listed after the O and H advantages.
TNCs from transition economies undertake the same kind of calculation of locational 
advantages as other TNCs when deciding to invest abroad: They consider whether the 
“factor endowments” (L advantages) in a host country are strong enough to overcome 
the risks and costs associated to their foreignness. Nevertheless, the degree of foreignness 
may be lower for them in markets with which they are familiar (Kuznetsov, 2008): Russian 
TNCs invest at relative ease in certain CIS countries, while Slovenia firms invest with ease 
in South-East Europe. The locational advantages of host economies also depend on the 
motivation of TNCs. For efficiency seeking TNCs, the main issue is that the production 
costs of the foreign location should not be higher than at the home base. In turn, for market 
seeking TNCs, a high-income (and hence high-cost) location is particularly advantageous, 
while for resource-seeking investors, the availability of resources primes over all other 
considerations.
In the case of Russian TNCs, the most salient feature is the prominence of market seeking 
motives in their strategies (they seek first of all, the control of downstream markets). For 
that reason, they follow mostly global expansion strategies, with the (EU and the U.S. being 
their prime target locations. The most important Russian firms are natural-resource based 
companies that operate upstream. They aim at integrating the supply chain downstream, to 
the level of the consumer (as witnessed by Gazprom’s investment in European pipelines or 
Lukoil’s purchase of Getty’s gas stations in the U.S.). In addition, there are also some Russian 
firms expanding to the CIS in industries such as telecommunications (e.g. VimpelCom, 
Mobile TeleSystems), where cultural proximity matters. As Russian outward FDI has been 
always dominated by market seeking motivations, it is no surprise that Russian TNCs have 
targeted mostly developed countries. 
The motivations of TNCs from new EU member countries are also mostly market 
seeking. However, they do not possess assets upstream, and therefore their expansion 
is mostly limited to neighbouring countries, often at a lower level of development as 
themselves. As for the few TNCs from other CIS countries, they are also mostly market 
seeking. For the moment being however, they have limited their downstream expansion to 
their own region. 
Internalization advantages
Internalization advantages refer to a specific capability of TNCs, inherited from their quality 
of firms (Coase, 1937): they are able to eliminate markets as a mechanism of coordinating 
international transactions, and to own, manage and coordinate efficiently assets owned 
in foreign countries. In most cases, TNCs prefer to internalize their foreign activities in 
order to reduce risks and uncertainty related to transaction costs, or to reduce the risk of 
losing control over technology.  Internalization however implies at least two types of costs: 
one of them is related to the acquisition of assets and their opportunity cost; the other 
is related to the costs of coordinating across the borders. For that reason, TNCs in real 
life always combine internalization with external transactions (e.g. alliances, non-equity 
joint ventures, outsourcing, arm’s length market transactions), and keep only the “strict 
minimum” under their own governance.
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TNCs from emerging economies are not different from other TNCs in terms of their 
selection of internalization versus other forms of international coordination. One would 
say that given the slow start of outward FDI from these countries, future TNCs used to 
be conservative at the beginning of transition. It can be hypothesized too that these firms 
needed a period of learning from other types of international transactions (mostly trade), 
before moving abroad.
The types of internalizations undertaken by TNCs form the Russian Federation, other 
CIS and new EU member countries are different. Russian TNCs have preferred mostly 
the vertical integration of their value chains, mostly towards the downstream. In certain 
other cases, large Russian groups have combined the horizontal and vertical integration of 
production capacities in their industries. The preferred vertical integration in certain foreign 
countries (especially developed markets) while relied on oligopolistic or monopolistic 
behaviour and conglomeration efforts in the Russian Federation and other CIS countries. 
Under conglomeration, the groups of firms can also include not just production facilities 
but also distribution networks and banking (which used to be separated from production 
during Soviet times). Alfa Bank, for example, is the ‘banker’ of the Alfa Group mentioned 
above. In this case, the bank acts as the coordinator of the group. In the case of the Gazprom 
Group, the roles are the reverse, and the production company controls the Gazprombank. 
In the rest of CIS countries, the little evidence on outward FDI would suggest a behaviour 
similar to those of the Russian firms, relying mostly on vertical integration (downstream).
In terms of internalization, TNCs from the “Seven Dwarves” are different form Russian 
and CIS TNCs as they have preferred horizontal integration in their  efforts of foreign 
expansion. This type of integration is related partly to the industry composition of such 
FDI (e.g. in the case of Slovenian supermarkets or Hungarian banks going abroad) and to 
the fact that in the majority of cases these firms invested abroad in order to overcome the 
limited size of their domestic market. In that sense, the foreign market is a kind of extension 
of the domestic one, where activities and competitive strengths are supposed to be similar, 
and cultural proximity and familiarity with the local business environment matter. This 
kind of foreign expansion in turn requires ownership advantages different from those of 
Russian TNCs: less based on financial strength and more on familiarity with markets. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, in most cases, the ownership advantages of TNCs from economies in 
transition, and Russian TNCs in particular, although not as developed as of TNCs from 
developed or developing countries, enable them to expand abroad smoothly. One can 
also hypothesize that in certain cases when ownership advantages are not yet complete, 
they are partly replaced by home country advantages (such as the backing of the state, see 
section 4.32. above), which enable them to invest abroad despite their apparent ownership 
handicap. Indeed, in those cases, State ownership and government policies play a major 
role in promoting outward FDI. 
As for the impact of the crisis of 2008–2009, the main question is to what degree it 
hinders, or even washes back, FDI from economies in transition. As the crisis is far from 
being over at the moment of writing this article, only hypotheses can be formulated about 
the cross cutting issues related to the crisis. In other words, we have to ask if there are any 
advantages that could be derived from the current crisis (table 3). It is a question that seems 
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to be a bit unusual given the fact that (mostly rightly) the opinion on the crisis emphasizes 
the downsides.
From the point of view of TNCs form economies in transition, and especially the 
Russian Federation, the crisis puts an end to a period of very fast expansion abroad. Such an 
expansion would have needed to slow down and give way to a period of consolidation. The 
crisis in that sense acts as a catalyst of consolidation of assets abroad; it also acts as a catalyst 
for increasing help from the Russian State. This situation is very different from those of the 
TNCs from new EU member countries which do not possess a financial backing similar 
to Russian TNCs and hence seem to be more fragile (table 3). They may more often risk 
bankruptcy or being bought by larger TNCs. For them, the main aim during the crisis may 
be survival. TNCs from other CIS countries in turn may benefit from the fact of coming 
from mostly isolated countries, at least in the short run. The few State-owned TNCs of these 
countries do not risk any major upheaval in the near future.
The future of Russian outward FDI will also hinge on the capabilities of Russian TNCs to 
withstand their current difficulties (mostly, but not exclusively, by using their O advantages). 
One can construct three scenarios: an optimistic one, a base line (“muddle through”) and 
a pessimistic one. An optimistic scenario can build on quick turnaround in the external 
environment, such as a recovery in oil and metals prices, coupled by a capacity of Russian 
TNCs to restructure themselves quickly (perhaps through a further consolidation of the 
industry). The probability of this scenario is further strengthened by the experience of the 
Russian Federation with the previous major crisis (in 1998), when most outward investing 
firms (especially Lukoil) managed to use foreign assets to shield their companies against the 
effects of the crisis (UNCTAD, 1999). A baseline scenario would mean a more protracted 
crisis, with a recovery in domestic factors such as GDP and stock markets picking up 
slowly, forcing TNCs to hold back foreign expansion by various years. Finally, a catastrophe 
scenario – although little unlikely, but to be mentioned for the sake of completeness – 
would lead a series of bankruptcies in Russian business, wiping out some of past expansion 
by Russian TNCs. This scenario can however only take place is the global crisis turns out to 
be much severe than currently thought, and the Russian State loses all financial resource to 
be used to bail out large Russian firms (e.g. through accelerating capital flight). 
Outward FDI from The Russian Federation is also expected to remain closely related to 
state participation. The final format of the relationship between the state and large firms 
will have major implications for the future. If those firms are ‘washed back’ to dependent 
status, they will become followers of the Government’s foreign policy, independently 
of their ownership. If the rise of the state’s power is contained, on the other hand, one 
can expect more private interest and more diverse strategies from Russian TNCs. Future 
research needs to keep up with new developments in this respect, and provide objective, 
scientific explanations for them.
For the future of general analytical tools, such as the eclectic paradigm, the main 
challenge of the current situation (crisis, emergence of new players) is how to keep up with 
the changing realities of the world. This article has suggested one way, that is to extend it to 
a separate home country factor. In this article, most of the hypotheses have been formulated 
about the economies in transition, in which probably there is the most evident need for 
such extension. We would expect however that the same hypothesis could be tested on 
other emerging-market firms, as the latter tend to have less clear ownership advantages than 
their developed-country peers and in turn more influenced by home-country conditions. 
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This can be also one way to save at least a part of the mostly defunct BRIC hypothesis. For 
example, despite the dissimilarities, an analysis of home country factors in Brazil, China and 
India in general, and during the crisis in particular, could highlight some kinds of patterns 
that could lead to certain conclusions. For example, one could build a measurement of the 
degree of home country affects, and see if those have implications for the outward FDI and 
its resilience to crisis in individual countries. Naturally, this testing could go well beyond 
the former BRICs, and encompass various regional groups (African, Asia, Latin American), 
making he analysis even more solid.  
All in all, the extension of the eclectic paradigm to a home country leg allows us to 
better understand and organize the information available on Russian TNCs. It can lead 
to conclusions about its future both in a global context and regionally – even compared 
with the mostly dissimilar BRIC countries: for example, we may hypothesize a situation 
whereby Russian outward FDI grows slower than outward FDI from Brazil, China and 
India, a scenario under which State participation in Russian outward FDI further increases, 
becoming more important that in outward FDI from China.17 It can also feed back to the 
theory of developed-country TNCs. Under the circumstances of the economies crisis of 
2008–2009, it became more visible how TNCs from those countries, and their international 
activities, may depend on developments in their home basis, both in terms of risks of 
bankruptcy affecting the whole global network of the TNC, and home government actions 
affecting outward FDI (in the current situation, these are mostly protectionist measures 
trying to dissuade outward FDI): These phenomena have been with us for a while, but have 
been a bit neglected; as the crisis makes them more frequent, one day they may find their 
way to the mainstream analysis, leading to an OLIH applied to developed-country TNCs, 
too.
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